Minutes (Public Version)

Meeting London Local Resilience Forum

Date Thursday 8 November 2012

Time 3.00 pm

Place Committee Room 5, City Hall

Chair: James Cleverly AM

Attending (in alphabetical order of organisation):

Don Randall, Head of Security, Bank of England (Business Sector Panel)

Matt Allingham, Chief Inspector, British Transport Police

John Barradell, Town Clerk and Chief Executive, City of London Corporation

Ian Harrison, Head of Resilience and Community Safety, City of London Corporation

Ian Dyson, Assistant Commissioner, City of London Police

James Cruddas, Head of Resilience and Emergencies Division, Department for Communities and Local Government

Howard Davidson, Director South East, Environment Agency

Mark Beveridge, Strategic Emergency Preparedness Manager, Health Protection Agency Mike More, Chair, Local Authorities Panel

Jason Killens, Deputy Director of Operations, London Ambulance Service

Col Hugh Bodington, Chief of Staff, London District (Military)

Ron Dobson, Commissioner, London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Andrew Pritchard, Head of Emergency Planning, London Fire Brigade

Mark Rowley, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service

Nicki Smith, Head of Emergency Preparedness, NHS London

Sarah Burchard, Emergency Risk Specialist, Thames Water

Seamus Kelly, St John Ambulance (Voluntary Sector Panel)

Nigel Furlong, Head of Resilience Planning, Transport for London (Transport Sector Panel)

Greater London Authority officers:

Tom Middleton, Head of Performance and Governance Hamish Cameron, London Resilience Manager Dale Langford, Senior Committee Officer

1. Introductions and Apologies for Absence

- 1.1 The Chair welcomed representatives to the meeting and announced that he would take Item 4 before Item 3 to allow time for the Metropolitian Police Service representative to arrive.
- 1.2 Apologies had been received from Adrian Leppard, Chief Constable, City of London Police; John O'Brien, Chief Executive, London Councils; Mark Rogers, Met Office Advisor (Civil Contingencies), Met Office; and Peter Guy, Operational Security &

Continuity Planning Manager, Network Rail

2. Minutes and Matters Arising from Previous Meeting

2.1 The Forum confirmed the minutes of the meeting of the Forum held on 2 July 2012 as a correct record to be signed by the Chair.

3. Discussion of Key Lessons Identified from the London 2012 Games (Item 4)

- 3.1 The Chair acknowledged the wide range of aspects of the Games that had gone well, but asked partner organisations to focus on the lessons that could be drawn from the experience.
- 3.2 <u>City of London Police</u> explained that in terms of planning and operational activity, its main role had been in supporting the MPS. Some aspects of communications and information sharing could be improved, but there was caution about over-engineering less significant events by trying to replicate the complex infrastructure used for the Games.
- 3.3 <u>British Transport Police</u> reported that it was using the experience of the Olympics to inform plans for New Year's Eve, in particular using the Transport Coordination Centre.
- 3.4 <u>London Fire Brigade</u> reported that it had based its preparations on existing plans, but some structures had improved upon what was in place previously. Suggested it is time now to review current procedures and plans in the partnership to see if they can be brought together into a smaller number of more strategic plans.
- 3.5 <u>London Ambulance Service</u> reported that it was reviewing how interoperability worked during the Games.
- 3.6 <u>London District</u> indicated that the London Resilience Forum and Partnership had worked, enabling relationships to be built up beforehand. However, command and control systems had not been tested in a crisis environment, so opportunities to build on multi-agency training should be seized upon over the next 18 months to two years. It was suggested that bringing in resources from other parts of the country at an earlier stage would have helped. The London Ambassadors should be used as a resource in the future, potentially in a time of crisis.
- 3.7 NHS London reported that integrating work at a local level had continued following the Games and liaison with Transport for London over issues like the impact of cycle races had helped build up that relationship. Business continuity down to the GP and pharmacy level had been bolstered. Relationships with the new commissioning boards were tested and it was also helpful to have engagement at a senior level in issues such as bed capacity. It was noted that health issues were not included in testing and exercising as early as they could usefully have been.
- 3.8 The Health Protection Agency reported that it had been able to carry out business as

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normal. It had been possible for the first time to share health data on athletes and officials to link up with the World Health Organisation monitoring of communicable diseases. Need for urgent clarification around structures and triggers for health response in London.

- 3.9 <u>The Voluntary Sector Panel</u> reported that St John Ambulance and the Red Cross were in the process of restructuring over the summer and were in the process of transferring planning and management into new structures. Despite that, mutual aid had been ramped up higher and for longer than has previously been attempted.
- 3.10 The Business Sector Panel reported that Cross-sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) had worked well, with individual communications with sectors working as well as wider communication to all businesses. However, the system was not tested in crisis conditions. With MPS support, the legacy of the Games would be a focus on communicating with businesses, particularly small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), with the aim of reaching 80% of SMEs in London.
- 3.11 <u>Transport for London</u> reported that one of the significant benefits had been integration across all transport modes and making assessments of parts of the system that were likely to fail. The public were given extensive warning and informing about worst case scenarios. The lesson drawn was that the public should be given as much information as possible to help them make decisions about their travel behaviour. Deploying staff in advance to 'hotspots' worked well and is being considered for future events.
- 3.12 <u>The Environment Agency</u> reported that there had been nine major flooding incidents in 2012, which had shown that the structure of Strategic Coordinating Group and COBR in other areas worked well. The Environment Agency endorsed recommendation 13 in the report.
- 3.13 <u>The Utilities Sector Panel</u> reported that the Games had highlighted a gap in knowledge among resilience partners about how the utilities industries work, particularly in relation to interoperability. Gaps and interdependencies need to be explored further.
- 3.14 <u>The Sub-regional Tier Secretariat</u> asked how impetus would be maintained, how lessons identified would be refined and taken forward. A small panel was proposed to look at the recommendations and feed into the review of resilience being discussed under Item 6 on the agenda.
- 3.15 The City of London Corporation reported that for the first time it had worked across all the key front-line operational departments within the authority and with all neighbouring boroughs to ensure a seamless operation. An Event Liaison Team (ELT) will be established for the Lord Mayor's Show on 10 November, using the model established in the Olympics with the City of Westminster. It will be important to ensure that lessons and new ways of working together are reinforced before too many of those involved have moved on.
- 3.16 The Local Authorities Panel highlighted the boroughs' capacity to work in an integrated zonal way. There were a number of reviews going on, so there needed to be a mechanism to avoid duplication or omission of particular areas. There was some comments as to whether the exercises had been as thorough as they should have been, particularly end-to-end testing.

- 3.17 <u>London Councils</u> stated that the roles and responsibilities were suited to the scale of this one specific event, so the review should consider what elements were appropriate for taking forward, with limited resources.
- 3.18 The Department for Communities and Local Government reported that national risk assessments would be distributed shortly with events organised by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the first quarter of 2013/14. The national training and exercise programme was being reworked back to a resilience focus, having focused on the Games.
- 3.19 <u>The Metropolitan Police Service</u> reported that it had run as a single organisation to maximise economies of scale. The Diamond Jubilee events had enabled the MPS to trial a more assertive, interventionist approach to dealing with issues as they arose. The fixed date of the Games provided an urgency and pragmatism to resilience matters.
- 3.20 The London Resilience Team explained that the recommendations in the report were in draft. The working group proposed by the Sub-regional Fora Secretariat would need to start work quickly to meet the timescale for the review of resilience.
- 3.21 The Chair highlighted the importance of training in addition to exercising, to allow all involved to make mistakes and learn from them in a mutually supportive setting. He also emphasised the need to replicate the ability to focus resources in the way that had been possible for the Games for unplanned events or emergencies.
- 3.22 The Chair also questioned the need for a separate plan for every eventuality and asked whether a smaller number of more flexible, adaptable plans might be more appropriate in future.
- 3.23 The Chair invited members of the Forum to take part in the review of lessons learned and recommendations to take forward, particularly to volunteer to chair the small working group.

4. Horizon Scan (Item 3)

Threats

4.1 The Metropolitan Police Service gave an oral report on current threats, noting that the terrorism threat levels from both international remained 'Substantial' and that the threat from dissident Republican sources was 'Moderate'.

Hazards

4.2 DCLG gave a short briefing on perceived hazards that could have an impact on London over the next six months.

5. Changes in the Health Sector

5.1 NHS London described the major changes to the NHS from April 2013 resulting from the Health and Social Care Act 2012. The changes include the establishment of Clinical Commissioning Groups in London, one national NHS Commissioning Board and a new body; Public Health England. Primary Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities are being abolished and there will be an enhanced role for local authority

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- directors of public health. NHS emergency preparedness resilience and response EPRR staff will not be able to participate at a borough level. A copy of a presentation showing the changes to NHS structures is attached as **Appendix 1**.
- 5.2 The NHS Commissioning Board, Public Health England and acute trusts will be Category 1 Responders. Clinical Commissioning Boards will be Category 2 Responders. The London Local Health Resilience Partnership (LHRP) having no response status.
- 5.3 The Department of Health remain engaged in policy development to ensure that plans are fit for purpose. There will be four NHS Commissioning Board Regional Offices to cover England, including one for London. The London office will have three teams covering North West London, North East and Central London, and South London. The NHS Board office for London will have an EPRR system up and running from 7 January 2013, so that it will be in place ready for 31 March. In the meantime, the current system remained in place. The LHRP will be accountable for for reassurance and national consistency relating to resilience
- The Health Protection Agency reported that the HPA will become part of Public Health England (PHE), along with the National Treatment Agency for Drug Misuse and Strategic Health Authority public health teams from 1 April 2013. PHE will exist in shadow form from 1 January. The main focus of PHE will be to provide national leadership for the health of the nation and would have four regions with the same boundaries as the NHS Commissioning Board Regional Offices. In terms of EPRR, PHE would become an executive arm of the Department of Health from 1 April 2013.
- 5.5 <u>The Local Authorities Panel</u> reported that colleagues from London boroughs were working closely with the health sector to ensure a relatively smooth transition.

6. Review of London Resilience

- 6.1 The London Resilience Manager introduced the report, explaining that partner bodies were asked to provide responses to the key questions by 14 December 2012. The responses would provide the basis for further discussions prior to the next meeting of the Forum in February 2013. The London Resilience Manager acknowledged that the timetable for the review was tight.
- 6.2 In discussion, the following points were made:
 - Responses could cover different timescales, such as the next year, three years and five years - or to Comprehensive Spending Review cycles as partners see fit;
 - The context of what was agreed when the GLA took on the responsibility from the former Government Office for London should be taken into account;
 - The review needs to find the right balance between the way resilience work is going to be done and what business the Forum and Partnership do;
 - With constrained financial and staff resources, the focus should be on working smartly, being pragmatic and business focused;
 - Ensuring that there remains a mechanism for identifying and disseminating threats and risks and assessing the totality of the resources available such as

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shared emergency planning services among boroughs;

6.3 The Chair emphasised the importance of having a jointly agreed and clearly stated mission statement for the Forum as well as a mechanism for identifying risks and ensuring mitigation is addressed. The Chair encouraged all members of the Forum to respond by 14 December.

7. Operational Arrangements between the Metropolitan Police Service and London Ambulance Service

- 7.1 The MPS raised the issue of the increased workload facing the police in supporting London Ambulance Service. The MPS had met London Ambulance Service to ask the LAS to review the situation.
- 7.2 The LAS recognised the difficulties the MPS faced and are currently working towards a solution.
- 7.3 The Chair asked that the LAS share its short term plan and the results of its review of capacity and demand management review.

8. Updates from Sub-regional and Borough Resilience Fora

- 8.1 The Sub-regional Tier Secretariat gave a brief update to remind members that there were 33 borough resilience fora as well as six sub-regional fora. 30 of the borough fora were chaired by the borough, Wandsworth's and Islington's were chaired by the MPS and Enfield's was chaired by the London Fire Brigade. In the last year the number of borough fora with business plans had increased from around half to 100% and these would be reviewed at a sub-regional level. All the borough fora met at least twice a year, the majority meeting four times a year.
- 8.2 The Sub-regional fora had not met since the Games, but their next meetings would be to look at the legacy opportunities of the Games and to feed into the review of resilience, such as how resilience work was rolled out across London.
- 8.3 NHS London commented that the NHS would not be in a position to participate at a borough level. The Sub-regional Tier Secretariat confirmed that participation from the NHS would be required only down to sub-regional level.

9. Any Other Business

9.1 There was no other business.

10. Date of Next Meeting

10.1 The next meeting was scheduled for 4 February 2013 at 3.00pm. It was noted that the Chair would not be available to chair that meeting.